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ABSTRACT 
 
The article addresses Max Weber’s relevance for modern social science. The first part is a 
quantitative assessment of Weber’s fate in mainstream sociology; the second part presents an 
argument that Weber’s work contains elements of combinatorial thinking which makes it suitable 
for analysis in terms of the methodological apparatus developed by Charles Ragin. On the one 
hand, it is shown that Ragin’s notation and concepts are useful in bringing out some important 
features in Weber’s methodology and substantive writings. On the other hand, it is suggested that 
Weber’s use of configurations extend into areas that have received little attention in mainstream 
sociology.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ambition of this special issue of Etica & politica / Ethics & Politics is to assess 
Max Weber’s relevance for contemporary social science at the beginning of the 
third millennium. That is a warranted question, but it is too vast in scope to be 
addressed in one piece. It needs to be sliced up into more manageable chunks. 
And the question is how. For my part, I would like to begin by taking my cue from 
Weber’s Science as a Vocation, and indulge in that pedantic custom, peculiar to the 
empirical scientist, of “always beginning with the external conditions”. (2) That is to 
say, we start out by treating the question as an empirical matter, and ask to what 
extent elements of weberian thought are present in contemporary social science. 
This exposition is followed by a discussion where we take leave of the “is” and 
enter the “ought”.  
In purely empirical terms, Max Weber has an impressive record. He is rarely 
absent from sociology textbooks, and there is a bewildering amount of specialist 
literature on different facets of his work. These categories of writings are no doubt 
important in their own right. The first provides an index of transmission to future 
generations of scholars; the second points to the evolution of a separate field of 
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research, halfway between philology and the scientific disciplines it feeds on and 
recruits scholars from. Yet, important as these two areas are, they give little 
information about Max Weber’s position in mainstream social scientific research. 
To this end, we must turn to other sources. I am not so much concerned here with 
citation frequencies, as measured through the Social Sciences Citation Index. These 
figures do tell us something about Weber’s current popularity, and they reveal a lot 
about co-citation patterns. But to the extent that Weber’s concepts have become so 
commonplace that references are thought to be superfluous, they pass through the 
loopholes of the SSCI. Moreover, the SSCI only takes us back to 1986.  
From this point of view it seems appropriate to use JSTOR as a data source. It 
allows us to perform Boolean searches in a full-text archive that covers the major 
Anglophone sociological journals from 1895 onwards. (3) Let us see, first, how 
often Max Weber is mentioned in sociological journals from 1895 to 2000, and 
how the number of articles mentioning varies from one period to the next. (4) One 
complication with this procedure is that the number of journals increases over time. 
But this problem is circumvented by reporting ratios, i.e. the number of articles 
quoting Max Weber over the total number of articles, instead of absolute numbers. 
 
The corresponding figures for Durkheim and Simmel serve as points of comparison:  
The figures show, unsurprisingly, that Max Weber’s popularity with the sociologists 
attention from the sociological community.  
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began to rise in the second half of the 1930s, i.e. immediately after the publication 
of Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1937). From the mid 1960s, 
Max Weber is mentioned in approximately every twentieth sociological article. By 
any standard, that is a high proportion. The comparison with the fate of other 
sociological classics reveals that Weber is not the only one who receives massive 
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But JSTOR searches need not be limited to persons. Let us therefore employ the 
same material to charter the uses of a couple of concepts and notions with a 
weberian pedigree. Consider first the concept “ideal type” and its derivatives. (5) A 
JSTOR-search in sociological articles yields a total of 1271 entries for the period 
1895-2000, roughly 12 articles per year. As we would expect, they are not evenly 
distributed. If we transform the absolute numbers into ratios, in the same way as we 
did above, we get the following picture:   
Proportion of sociological articles quoting "ideal type"
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The early peak should be interpreted with care, as should all figures from the early 
years. The number of items is low up until the 1920s, varying between 23 and 48 
articles annually, which means that percentage levels are sensitive to very small 
variations even as we compound the figures into five-year periods. We are on safer 
ground from 1925 onwards, for the average number of articles per annum takes a 
leap to 180 and continues to rise. (6) But the early years are interesting from 
another perspective. It is not until 1930 that “ideal type” becomes associated with 
Max Weber. Until then, the terms have no relation to the German economist, at 
least not in the sociological articles archived with JSTOR. As used then, the concept 
“ideal type” is used in another sense, and is grafted upon other sources. (7) The 
next chart portrays the number of articles that mention “ideal type”, and the 
corresponding number of articles belonging to the sub-class of articles quoting both 
“ideal type” and “Max Weber”.  
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 Ideal type and Max Weber: co-citation
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The figures show that the take-off for the concept coincides with the upsurge for 
Weber’s popularity. It came in the second half of the 1930s. From this point 
onwards, the concept becomes increasingly entrenched in sociology. The rise is 
broken in the 1980s, and quotation frequencies oscillate within the interval 128 
and 148 articles per five-year period (between 2.4 and 3.4 per cent of the total 
number of sociological articles). (8) 
What is of particular interest here is that, from the mid 1930s to the 1980s, 
frequencies for the sub-class dovetail at half distance with those for the super-
ordinate class. Approximately half of the articles that quote “ideal type” also 
mention Max Weber. One obvious consequence of the fact that the correspondence 
between the two classes has never been perfect is that there are many “hidden” 
references to Weber that cannot be detected by citation frequencies. We can safely 
assume that the lion’s share of the sociologists who mention the phrase have a 
weberian version in mind. They may have quoted it from secondary sources, or 
they may have assumed that the origin and meaning of the concept is so well known 
that they could safely go on with their business without making references to Max 
Weber. The concept is thus de-coupled from its inventor and leads a life of its own. 
At the same time, there is a very good correlation between the two classes up until 
1980. Within a certain interval, information about how many articles belong to the 
sub-class allows us to infer the number of articles in the super-ordinate class, and 
vice versa. That neat correspondence seems to be broken after the 1980s, a sign 
that the de-coupling process has evolved further.  
The analysis of the fate of “ideal types” in mainstream sociology could be taken 
further, e.g. by asking questions about which journals serve as niches for the 
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concept or by inquiring into its different uses. Such inquiries, however, would take 
us too far from our present concerns. We shall instead move on to consider a 
second weberian concept, namely “protestant ethic”. Again, the focus is on the 
reception in mainstream sociology, rather than on the voluminous specialist 
literature. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism became available in 
English in 1930, through Talcott Parsons’ translation. This was also the decade 
when “protestant ethic” made its debut in sociological journal articles. But as the 
next chart shows, the real take-off came later.  
 
 
he phrase “protestant ethic” never quite reaches the same level of popularity 
that what we see in these figures is the making of a 
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enjoyed by “ideal type” but their trajectories are nevertheless similar in shape: a 
sharp rise immediately before or during the Second World War, a long period of 
escalation in the Post-War period, and a subsequent stabilisation at fairly high 
levels. The patterns for the individual concepts recapitulate the pattern for 
references to “Max Weber”.  
An argument could be made 
classic. They tell the story of sociology’s emerging reliance on a corpus of 19th and 
early 20th century greats. It is indeed a curious fact that the first crystallisation of 
the classics coincides with sociology’s scientistic era, i.e. with the attempt to rid the 
discipline from historical ballast and fashion it after the natural sciences. It is the 
same period when variable-oriented analysis became the preferred mode of 
analysis. Our present concern, however, is not with the general development of the 
discipline but with the fate of Max Weber in mainstream sociology. From this point 
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of view, the data quoted above gives ample evidence that Weber and his conceptual 
constructs are thoroughly entrenched in sociological discourse.  
 
 
2. Beyond the empirical pattern 
 
These few empirical facts about Max Weber’s reception in the sociological 
community do not exhaust the discussion of Weber’s relevance for contemporary 
social science. By this I do not mean that a larger set of weberian concepts should 
be made objects empirical analysis in the same vein as we have done with “ideal 
type” and “protestant ethic”. To be sure, a host of candidate concepts queue up 
were we to go down that road. What are the fates of, for example, “charisma”, 
“value-freedom”, “Zweckrational”, “Wertrational”, “bureaucracy”, “status”, or 
“legitimacy”? Each of these concepts are amenable to empirical inquiry, even if 
some of them pose technical difficulties. “Zweckrational” has been translated 
differently by different authors, as has “Wertfreiheit”. And apart from parallel 
renderings of the same concept, we also have to grapple with the fact that Weber 
has no monopoly on everyday words such as “bureaucracy”, “legitimacy”, and 
“status”, so that measuring the “weberness” of their uses would require extensive 
reading of the texts.  
These are formidable problems, but they are not insurmountable and they are not 
the reason we stop short of further empirical analysis. The reason is that we want to 
pose a question of a different order. Granted that at least part of Weber’s work has 
in fact trickled into mainstream sociology, we are still entitled to ask whether his 
continued influence is justified. Should sociologists devote so much attention to 
him? Should they use his conceptual apparatus, reiterate and adapt his arguments, 
follow his methodological advice? As long as we remain on the level of general 
references to Max Weber, there is only one way of answering these questions. Yes, 
sociologists should still read Weber, provided that doing so helps them formulate, 
clarify, or solve the problems at hand. This attitude is truly weberian. It is 
nevertheless far from clear that sociologists have always heeded to this rule. I am 
not convinced, for example, that the analysis of social action has benefitted from 
repeatedly returning to Max Weber’s typology of action. In the end, the value of 
weberian notions must be assessed by those who do work in the respective research 
fields.  
Now consider a complication. Some of Weber’s concepts and ideas have been torn 
from the vast edifice and are disposed of freely among modern social scientists. As 
Peter Baehr has shown,(9) the “iron cage” – surely the emblem of Max Weber’s 
thought as represented in textbooks – is Talcott Parsons’ invention. Weber’s 
original metaphor, “stahlhartes Gehäuse”, evokes a quite different image. But as 
Baehr himself recognises, the vivid parsonian metaphor has become canonical in 
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the social sciences.(10) This is exactly the point. Even if Baehr’s own translation 
returns to the original metaphor, it is far from likely that the “iron cage” will go 
away. The example is admittedly somewhat inconsequential, but it clarifies a 
general principle: as the specialist literature revises old conceptions, the new Max 
Weber will still be in the company of some old Webers. Which of these 
Doppelgänger should we opt for? In view of what was said above, there is a sound 
argument for preferring the fertile-and-incorrect interpretation over the barren-and-
correct one. This being said, however, I would also argue that the Weber of the 
modern specialist literature has more interesting things to say than the blander 
duplicates who inhabit mainstream sociology. It is perhaps significant that economic 
sociology, a field where some leading scholars are also intimately familiar with the 
specialist literature on Weber, is one area where Weber’s thought is put to creative 
use.  
Cross-fertilisation between these literatures would thus appear to be a means of 
extracting interesting research problems and avoiding analytical cul-de-sac. In fact, 
the entire argument so far has been a prelude to a concrete suggestion in that 
direction. To introduce it, we return to the concepts analysed above. Considering 
that the concept “ideal type” is used in roughly three per cent of the articles in 
sociological journals, this particular innovation must clearly be perceived to be a 
valuable instrument for the researcher. The concept has also been subject to 
extensive treatment in the Weber literature. If the frequent use in mainstream 
sociology signal a self-contained and self-explanatory concept, the specialist 
literature is hard pressed to determine its meaning, uses, and theoretical functions. 
Specialists are concerned with how ideal types relate to adequate cause theory. 
They worry whether the model for Weber’s ideal type concept is found in Georg 
Simmel’s, Heinrich Rickert’s, or someone else’s writings. They follow the different 
formulations of the concept, and confront it with its uses in Weber’s substantive 
writings. In short, they attempt to specify the concept by aligning it to proper 
contexts.  
What shall we make of this picture? Mainstream sociologists use “ideal types” so 
frequently that it must be perceived to be an analytical prêt-à-porter, but when 
Weber specialists get their hands on it, the clarity of the procedure seems to 
evaporate. The uncertainty is easy to explain. Max Weber’s famous formulations 
basically describe the outer contours of a procedure, coupled with a list of 
specifications of what the ideal type is not. To give a flavour of how he delimits the 
concept, it is useful to quote from the entry in Richard Swedberg’s Max Weber 
dictionary: 
 
Ideal type (Idealtypus) This is one of Weber’s most celebrated concepts, and it 
can in all brevity be described as an attempt to capture what is essential about a 
social phenomenon through an analytical exaggeration of some of its aspects. What 
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is at the heart of an ideal type, according to Weber’s famous formulation, is an 
‘analytical accentuation (Steigerung) of certain elements of reality’. […] An ideal 
type is a conceptual tool with which to approach reality; and in this sense it is a 
‘conceptual construct’ (Gedankenbild; MSS: 93). When confronted with an 
empirical situation, it is often helpful to introduce a series of ideal types. In doing 
so, Weber argues, it is more important to capture what is essential about a 
phenomenon than to merely reproduce the often confusing empirical situation: 
‘sharp differentiation in concrete fact is often impossible, but this makes clarity in 
the analytical distinctions all the more important’ (ES: 214). In this sense, the 
introduction of an ideal type serves as a first step in analysis. The ideal type ‘serves 
as a harbor until one has learned to navigate safely in the vast sea of empirical 
facts’ (MSS: 104). Once some order has been brought into an analysis through the 
introduction of ideal types, however, it may be important for the sociologist to 
decide why and how empirical reality deviates from these. (11) 
 
Thus, unless Weber’s formulations are inserted into a theoretical context, we have 
very little to go on. We have known for a long time what the ideal type is not. But it 
is a long step from there to a conception of the operations involved that is 
sufficiently clear to allow the empirical scientists to proceed with their business. 
From the practicing scientists’ point of view, the key issue is obviously how this 
analytical accentuation should be done. They presumably need to know how to go 
about selecting what is “essential” about their phenomenon, and how to distinguish 
a good ideal type from a bad one. So there is good reason for mainstream 
sociologists to consult the specialist literature on Weber. But this still leaves us with 
the question why the “ideal type” is one of Weber’s most celebrated concepts. I 
have a few suggestions, and they will point the way for the argument in the 
remainder of the article. 
The first reason is that, even in this muddled state, the concept names a common 
practice. After all, Max Weber’s intention with coining it was not to create a new 
practice but to codify and explicate an existing one. Consciously, or (more often) 
unconsciously, social scientists deal in ideal typical constructs: they engage in 
abstraction, accentuate parts of empirical reality, and form heuristic concepts from 
the elements so extracted. Surely there is some comfort in having a name for what 
you are doing.  
Second, the concept may have been appealing precisely because its construction 
principles are not written in stone. Its very indeterminacy made it adaptable and 
possible to accommodate within diverse research traditions. Nascent scientistic 
sociology could conceive of it in terms of property spaces, case study researchers 
could incorporate it into their work, as could their comparativist colleagues. Hence, 
even when the rift between different emerging research strands widened, the ideal 
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type could continue to have a habitat in several traditions. It remains an open 
question, of course, just how weberian these various uses are.  
The third reason provides a link between the first two. There is one aspect of Max 
Weber’s “ideal type” that makes it savoury for empirical scientists who are not 
content to  limit their research repertoire to regression analysis: it is combinatorial 
by design. It encourages the researcher to think in terms of configurations, rather 
than in terms of a bundle of separate variables. Charles Ragin has argued, and I 
believe correctly, that combinatorial reasoning in this sense is both central to the 
understanding of social phenomena and a constitutive part of the language of 
sociological theorising. (12)  
The crux, in Ragin’s view, is that sociological methods have evolved in ways which 
tend to obstruct the dialogue between ideas and evidence. A methodological divide 
has developed, where one part of the scholarly community favours variable-oriented 
studies and another part involves in case-oriented research. Both strands of 
research has its merits. Variable-oriented studies are powerful vehicles of 
generalisation, case-oriented studies are good at capturing complexity and diversity. 
The former uses individual cases to work out general explanations, the latter use the 
theoretical apparatus to interpret the case(s) at hand. On the other hand, both has 
its limitations. The homogenising assumptions of variable-oriented techniques, and 
their tendency to dissolve cases into single variables, blocks their ability to test the 
kind of configurational ideas which are part and parcel of sociological theory. And 
they give little guidance for the interpretation of specific cases, considered as 
wholes. Case-oriented studies, suitable for interpreting cases as wholes, are ill-
equipped to assess the generality and scope conditions of their conclusions. Ragin 
has made an elaborate attempt to combine the virtues of both strands of research, 
i.e. to preserve the focus on complexity, diversity, and interpretation, while at the 
same time allowing the researcher to make generalisations in a structured and 
orderly fashion. But Charles Ragin’s qualitative comparative analysis and fuzzy-set 
social science are recent innovations, and they are not embraced by everyone. The 
ideal type has long served as a justification for the case-oriented researcher. 
Vagueness apart, it had the promising feature of being a methodological concept 
which encouraged configurational thinking and had an air of generality.  
This leads up to the “ought” I promised at the outset. Case-oriented researchers 
who sensed that there was something useful – for their purposes – about the 
concept “ideal type” were not barking up the wrong tree. It is counter-productive, 
however, to restrict vision to this one concept. We should rather take a broader 
sweep over Max Weber’s methodology and see how his deliberations are shaped 
and channelled by a configurational thinking that is very much akin to that which 
has been developed by Charles Ragin. By doing so, we get to see Max Weber as a 
precursor to recent developments in sociological methods. Conversely, Charles 
Ragin’s elaboration of the logic of configurational analysis provides clues to the 
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interpretation of some features of Max Weber’s methodology. There is an elective 
affinity between Max Weber’s Problemlage and that of modern sociology, and it 
warrants renewed attention to Weber’s methodology, from mainstream sociologists 
as well as from Weber specialists.  
 
 
3. Concepts, combinations, configurations 
 
How do we preserve a configurational view of cases without sacrificing generality, 
and vice versa? How does the task of explaining unique events square with that of 
developing new theories? These questions are at the heart of Charles Ragin’s 
qualitative comparative analysis. They were no less important for Max Weber. In 
the introduction to Economy and Society, Günther Roth remarks that “…sociologists 
live, and suffer, from their dual task: to develop generalizations and to explain 
particular cases.” (13) The formulation captures a key concern in Max Weber’s 
work, but it could equally well serve as a motto for one of Charles Ragin’s books.  
Max Weber was above all concerned with interpreting and explaining particular 
events in the social world. This follows directly from the concept of value-relation. 
This concept, which Weber borrows from Heinrich Rickert, names the governing 
point of view which sets the cultural sciences apart from the natural sciences. To 
illustrate the logic peculiar to the latter category of sciences, we do best to consider 
how they go about transforming a certain sense datum into a scientific datum. 
Assume that we try to test a hypothesis, or work out a theory, by way of experiment. 
It is clear, then, that each observation, every single datum, can be substituted for 
any other datum in the relevant class. What is important is not that it is this drop of 
chemical solution that reacts in this way. Any other drop from the sample could do. 
Indeed, if a drop of chemical solution does not behave the same way as other drops 
of the same kind, our first guess would be that it has been contaminated. To be 
sure, an alternative possibility is that we are on the track of a scientific discovery, 
but the drop is nevertheless useless in this particular experiment. In other words: 
the natural sciences homogenise data, and only take an interest in those features 
which all instances have in common.  
All this does of course make perfectly good sense. The problem is that the cultural 
sciences operate differently. We are not interested in the unification of Germany, 
the French revolution, or the rise of capitalism merely because they are instances of 
some general classes. They are interesting to us in their own right – because of 
their cultural significance, because they have a relation to values. Consequently, we 
are not only interested in those traits which the French revolution have in common 
with all other revolutions, but are rather anxious to capture its distinguishing 
features and to describe it in such a way that relevant complexity is preserved.  
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It has been pointed out by several Weber scholars that Max Weber failed to 
provide definite criteria for when a phenomenon is value-relevant. But perhaps this 
was not quite the point. As it stands, the notion that the cultural sciences have 
value-relations as their governing point of view ascribes a peculiar dynamics to 
these sciences. The natural sciences are piecing together a giant jigsaw-puzzle. 
Their findings can be valuable either because they provide new applications of 
established theoretical knowledge, or because they contribute to the overall 
theoretical picture. In both cases, the dynamics of scientific evolution is intimately 
linked to the stock of established knowledge: a problem is taken up because it has a 
meaningful relation to theory. This is not necessarily so in the cultural sciences. We 
expect the cultural sciences to take an interest in the fall of the Soviet Union, or the 
attack on September 11, regardless of whether these events would help formulate a 
new general theory or are suitable applications of some preconceived theory. We 
want to explain them because they matter. And if this is the case, then the 
dynamics of the cultural sciences will often be driven by extra-theoretical concerns.  
This, at any rate, was Max Weber’s position. He placed heavy emphasis on the 
understanding and explanation of unique events. But this is not to say that he 
neglected, or could avoid, the issue of generalisation. I am not thinking here of the 
fact that Weber must establish and make reference to “empirical regularities”. This 
goes without saying. He needs such regularities both to create an object of inquiry – 
as he does, for example, in the first section of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism – and to anchor his causal claims. His adaptation of adequate cause 
theory to the cultural sciences, and his frequent allusions to probabilistic 
formulations in Economy and Society, make it clear that empirical regularities play 
an important role in his work. Yet there is another reason why issues of 
generalisation are unavoidable for Weber. Generalisation is in fact a constitutive 
part of his endeavour to explain unique events. To see why this is so, it is 
instructive to use The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as an example, 
and read it through the lenses provided by Charles Ragin. In Weber’s famous 
essay, configurational thinking enters the argument at two junctures. The first is in 
the conceptualisation of the explanandum, i.e. the “spirit” of capitalism: «If any 
object can be found for which the use of this term can have any meaning, then it 
can only be a “historical individual,” that is, a complex of configurations 
[Zusammenhänge] in historical reality which we group together conceptually from 
the point of view of their cultural significance to form a single whole.   
A historical concept like this, however, as it relates to a phenomenon which is 
significant in terms of its individual characteristics, cannot be defined or 
demarcated according to the schema: “genus proximum, differentia specifica”. It 
must be composed from its individual elements, taken from historical reality. It will 
not be possible to arrive at the ultimate definition of the concept at the outset but 
only at the conclusion of the investigation». (14)  
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The passage is filled with termini technici – e.g. “historical individual”, “cultural 
significance”, and the allusion to the impossibility of demarcating such objects of 
inquiry along the lines of aristotelian definition – derived from Heinrich Rickert’s 
work. They have no doubt contributed to shaking off a few readers, in our day as 
well as in his own time. Be that as it may: Weber wants to identify and explain what 
he has chosen to term the “spirit” of capitalism. But he wants to extract it from the 
empirical material rather than postulate it. The object of explanation is thus to be 
pieced together as we go along, from those individual elements which actually turn 
up in the data. By the end of the inquiry, he will thus have amassed an array of 
individual elements (a, b, c, …, n) which, taken as an ensemble, constitute the 
concept of this “spirit”.  
Note, however, that when a series of elements are added together in this fashion to 
form a configuration, the result – indeed the aim – is a highly individualising 
concept. Think of each “element” as a dichotomous variable, which can be either 
present or absent. With two requisite elements, the concept in question represents 
one of four possible combinations. Three constitutive elements yield eight 
combinations, four yield sixteen, five yield thirty-two, etc. With a dichotomous 
variable, the number of possible combinations are given by the formula 2n. Thus, if 
Weber identifies 10 elements as constitutive for his concept of the “spirit” of 
capitalism, it will represent one out of 1024 logically possible combinations. We 
can compare it to Alphonse Bertillon’s attempt to construct a procedure for 
identifying criminals: describe eleven measures on the body of the suspect, and you 
will get a description that is virtually as individualising as the fingerprint.  
What sets “historical individuals” apart from the individuality of the fingerprint is 
that the capacity to individualise is a necessary but not sufficient criterion. The 
construct formed out of these elements must also be endowed with cultural 
significance. In the essay, this is achieved by an argument that the “spirit” of 
capitalism is tantamount to a rational Lebensführung adequate for the forms of 
organisation peculiar to modern capitalism. To relieve possible doubts that Max 
Weber thinks of “historical individuals” in this combinatorial fashion, as 
configurations of an array of elements, it suffices to quote the following passage 
from another of his works: «Religions cannot … simply be inserted into a chain of 
types, each constituting a new “stage” in relation to the others. Rather, they are all 
historical individuals of a very complex kind, and the sum total of existing religions 
only exhaust a fraction of those possible combinations, which could imaginably be 
formed from the relevant factors. Thus, the following exposition is in no way 
conceived as a systematic “typology” over religions». (15) 
That is to say: each religion must be perceived as a historical individual, composed 
of a series of individual elements. But as noted above, it suffices that we assemble 
ten element, or presence/absence-conditions, to get a sum total of over a thousand 
logically possible combinations. Even with this very modest number of elements, 
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there simply are not enough religions to populate each combination. This is the 
reason why Max Weber would never aspire to a systematic typology over the world 
religions.  
Yet Max Weber’s configurational thinking is not confined to the construction of the 
explanandum. It is also at the heart of his explanation, which is – to use Charles 
Ragin’s terminology – a specimen of conjunctural and multiple causation. This 
feature makes it clear why the problem of generalisation is already contained in 
Weber’s quest to understand and explain unique events. As we will see, there is 
also reason to believe that the same feature accounts for some of the difficulties 
which his contemporaries, and modern commentators, have had in interpreting his 
argument. To bring these aspects out, we must first introduce some of Charles 
Ragin’s terminology and notation. “Multiple causation”, in Ragin’s terminology, is 
when there are several causal paths to the same outcome. “Conjunctural 
causation”, on the other hand, is when a particular condition A is not sufficient to 
produce the outcome Y, but will produce it if it appears in conjunction with B. 
What Ragin has done is to use Boolean algebra, truth tables, and truth functions to 
create a way of representing and investigating multiple and conjunctural causation. 
In Ragin’s notation, the presence of a condition is written in capital letters, e.g. 
“A”, while the absence of that condition is represented as “a”. This way of writing 
corresponds to the ones and zeros of Boolean algebra. The logical “AND” is written 
the same way as multiplication in standard mathematics, while the logical “OR” is 
written as addition. Thus, the equation “Y=A+B” tells us that the outcome Y will 
result if condition A is present or if condition B is present. This is multiple 
causation: there are more than one causal path to the same outcome. The equation 
“Y=A*B” – or “Y=AB” for short – tells us that Y will happen if and only if 
conditions A and B are simultaneously present. That is to say, the causal relation is 
conjunctural.  
Charles Ragin’s presence/absence-conditions should have a familiar ring. They 
correspond to the “elements” that make up “historical individuals” in Max Weber’s 
terminology. The key difference is that Ragin is concerned here with the explanans, 
Weber with the explanandum. But the effect of adding more “conditions” to the 
explanatory model is the same as that of adding more “elements” to the historical 
individual: for each added condition, the number of logically possible combinations 
doubles. Ragin’s technical achievement is that of implementing a set of algorithms 
that allows us to summarise and minimise boolean equations in such a way that the 
researcher can determine which combination of conditions are responsible for a 
particular effect. In this context, however, I would rather like to emphasise how his 
contribution adds to the language of theory and methodology. Using his notation, 
we get the following interpretation of the much more familiar notions of “necessary” 
and “sufficient” conditions.  
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                 C is necessary 
   Yes             No 
 
Y = C                          Y = C + B 
 
 
 
 
Y = Ca + CB          Y = aC + AB 
 
 
C is sufficient             Yes 
 
 
 
               No 
 
 
 
The first cell in the property space portrays a situation where the presence of 
condition C is both necessary and sufficient for the outcome Y. The second cell 
describes C as a sufficient condition. This is a case of simple multiple causation: the 
outcome Y results if C is present, but it can also come about in other ways. In the 
third cell, the presence of C is required if Y is to result, but it will not yield this 
result unless it is combined either with the absence of A or with the presence of B.   
Scholars in Weber’s day knew very well how to conceive of causes in terms of 
conditions that are “necessary and sufficient”, “sufficient”, or “necessary”. But 
what about the fourth cell? The condition C is not necessary, for there is a causal 
path which does not contain this condition, and it is not sufficient, for it will not 
produce the outcome unless it is combined with the absence of condition A. Yet it 
is clear from Ragin’s exposition that the condition C should be seen as causally 
important for the outcome Y in this case as well. It may be that the path containing 
condition C is particularly important, and that C is of particular importance for this 
path. It is an explanation of exactly this type which Max Weber had in mind in The 
Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism. In Charles Ragin’s terms, it is an 
explanation which posits a multiple and conjunctural causal bond between the 
explanandum and a set of conditions.  
This terminology was not available in Max Weber’s day. No wonder, then, that his 
contemporary and latter-day critics have been consternated. What was Weber 
actually saying? Did he think that puritanism was a necessary condition for the rise 
of capitalism? In that case he could easily be rebutted. One need only find 
instances of capitalism before, or otherwise unrelated to, the puritans. Or did he 
think that the puritan sects were somehow sufficient conditions for capitalism? That 
claim could also be shown false, this time by pointing to cases where we have a lot 
of puritianism but no capitalism. And the task of refuting Weber would, of course, 
be all the more facile if he was arguing that puritanism was both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for capitalism. There was no category and no name for the kind 
of argument Weber was pursuing, and it was consequently difficult for his critics to 
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assess the causal claims involved. Indeed, want of terminology created difficulties 
for Max Weber himself. This is evident from Weber’s frustrated replies to his 
critics: «Furthermore, I described as “foolish” the attempt to trace the derivation 
not only of the capitalist system but specifically also of the capitalist “spirit” (in my 
sense of word, be it noted – a matter to which I shall return) back to the 
Reformation alone. Additionally, I explicitly asserted that it was obvious that those 
religious and psychological conditions could only bring about the development of 
capitalism in conjunction with numerous other “conditions,” especially those of 
nature and geography». (16) 
The first sentence makes it clear that we are dealing with multiple causation, the 
second that we are dealing with conjunctural causation. Throughout the reply, 
which is addressed to Felix Rachfahl, Weber complains that he had pointed out 
these caveats already in his essay, and accuses his opponent of deliberately 
misconstruing his argument. His reaction is more than a bit high-strung. A more 
plausible explanation for the lack of communication is that Rachfahl and other 
critics tried to make sense out of Weber’s argument by fitting it into recognisable 
explanatory categories.  
When Max Weber declared that he did not take puritanism to be a necessary or 
sufficient condition for the rise of capitalism, and denied that he saw the first as the 
sole cause of the latter, his critics perceived him to be retreating. That insinuation 
made Weber even more furious, which is why his replies are filled with quotations 
from and references to the original essay. But what should the critics think? From 
their horizon, it surely looked like Max Weber was stepping back from a position 
they had shown to be untenable, to embrace instead a vague claim that puritanism 
can have some sort of undefined link to the rise of capitalism, which was perhaps 
not as important as he had first claimed. Unless you have embraced the idea that 
multiple and conjunctural causation can also be a specimen of causation, Weber’s 
replies will only appear as desperate scolastic manœuvres to avoid the critic cum 
bird of prey.  
To be sure, Max Weber’s polemic with his critics contains many other elements – a  
long list of invectives, squibbles over terminology, and disputes over facts. 
Nevertheless, I do think that the configurational nature of explanandum and 
explanans is one of the main reasons for the breakdown in communication between 
Max Weber and his critics. The methodological structure of The Protestant Ethic 
and the “Spirit” of Capitalism is in fact even more complicated than I have been 
able to show in these few pages. Even if the historical individual Max Weber 
construes from the “spirit” of capitalism is ultimately the explanandum, his essay 
does not deal with it in its entirety:  
«The task which I set myself was to reveal one (particularly important) series of 
causes which determined the formation of one (again, particularly important) 
constituent component of the spirit of modern capitalism: that is, a variety of this 
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spirit which differed in specific important ways from that of either the classical 
period or of the Middle Ages». (17)  
The first part of the quote recapitulates Weber’s insistance that he had all along 
recognised several paths to the outcome he is interested in. In the second part of 
the quote, he states that he does not not claim to have covered all the elements of 
the historical individual. What he also claims, however, is that the causal path 
containing the condition he investigates is particularly important, and that it is a 
particularly important part of that configuration. Moreover, he holds that the portion 
of the historical individual he is investigating is one of its particularly important 
elements. He regards the attitudes he has investigated as a synecdoche for the 
complex historical individual of the “spirit” of capitalism, and he does so precisely 
because they are ‘adequate’ to those forms of organisation which are peculiar to 
modern capitalism and set it apart from its predecessors.  
A full assessment of Weber’s argument would have to relate what we have just said 
to his use of adequate cause theory. That inquiry will have to be postponed to some 
other occasion. Instead, we should return to the question why Max Weber’s 
preoccupation with explaining unique events also entails the task of developing 
generalisations. Let us, for the sake of simplicity, say that Weber’s image of the rise 
of modern capitalism has the form “Y = aC + AB”, where C stands for the specific 
Lebensführung described in The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism. The 
equation points the way to other inquiries. First, it presents Weber with the task of 
investigating the second causal path. Second, it requires him to make additional 
inquiries to ascertain that the causal conditions of the first path does not pertain to a 
great amount of cases without producing the outcome. Third, Weber is obliged to 
investigate just how individualised is the explanandum. The equation creates a 
perfectly general reference class. Thus, even if the explanandum is designed to be 
radically individualised, and even if the explanation is derived from and tailored for 
one particular case, the suggested explanation is general in scope and it has to be 
checked against comparative data. The Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 
in which the essay on the protestant ethic is also inserted, is an attempt to do just 
that. This description is, admittedly, artificially simplified, for what Weber also does 
throughout these essays is to specify the scope conditions for his thesis. But this is 
all the more in line with our general argument.   
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This article is an attempt addressed Max Weber’s relevance for modern social 
science. In the empirical part, I have tried to charter to what extent modern 
sociology makes use of weberian concepts. The results show that Weber figures 
prominently in mainstream sociological discourse. It is another matter, however, 
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whether this continued influence is justified. The second part of the article argues 
that there is one particular area where closer inspection of Max Weber’s work 
would benefit both mainstream sociology and the specialist literature on Weber, 
and where cross-fertilisation between these literatures promise to yield interesting 
results, namely configurations. Recent developments in sociological methodology 
has revitalised a concern for combinatorial thinking that was central to Max Weber. 
And as a result of these modern efforts we are in a better position to grasp what 
Weber was trying to do, why he sometimes failed to be understood, and what other 
explanatory tasks his configurational thinking imposed on him. I have used Weber’s 
essay on the protestant ethic and the “spirit” of capitalism as an illustration, but the 
list of interesting applications can easily be extended. The often quoted concept 
“ideal type” – a construct that is combinatorial by design – is one obvious example 
where some Ragin-therapy could contribute to clarification and novel insights. 
Nor do the benefits flow one way only, from mainstream sociology to the specialist 
literature. Max Weber’s works gain new relevance once we recognise him as a 
precursor to these modern methodological developments. His works are waiting to 
be plundered and used as vast granaries full of neatly packed empirical grain. 
Moreover, it would be worthwhile to see if his theoretical vocabulary, which was 
shaped by a concern for preserving a configurational view of cases, contains useful 
elements which the modern literature has overlooked. Insofar as the construction of 
the explanandum is concerned, Weber’s conception of “historical individuals” still 
stand out as an original contribution to complexity-oriented social science. Now, 
constructing historical individuals is one way of arriving at an ideal type. Other 
principles are involved in the construction of genetic ideal types, and they too 
should be of interest to those who are engaged in qualitative comparative analysis.  
In conclusion, then, Max Weber should not be quoted and used because he is a 
classic. He should be used wherever and whenever his ideas and concepts aid the 
formulation and solution of concrete research problems, otherwise not. On the other 
hand, important aspects of his work are still awaiting treatment, and precisely these 
aspects appear to be important from the point of view of modern social science.  
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(4) The search has been limited to articles; no review essays or other items have 
been included. Since Weber is a too common name to allow precise measurement, 
I have used the search string [“Max Weber” OR “Weber, Max”]. Considering that 
this is a more restrictive function, the figures for Max Weber may well be 
underestimated, as compared to the other authors, where only one term was 
employed in the search.  
(5) Included in the search are such variations as “ideal typic”, “ideal-type”, and 
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late 18th and early 19th centuries. For a lengthier discussion, see Ola Agevall 
(1999) A Science of Unique Events: Max Weber’s Methodology of the Cultural 
Sciences, pp. 166ff. 
(8) These facts should also serve as a corrective to Uta Gerhardt’s assertions in her 
book on the ideal type: “Die soziologische Theorie, die heute Max Weber einen 
ihrer zwei unbestrittenen Klassiker nennt, verwendet keine Idealtypen. Nicht einmal 
interpretierende ‚Weberian Sociology’, die Webers Denken nachkonstruiert, 
plädiert für den Primat idealtypischer Verstehens. Zwar umfasst die 
Sozialforschung heute idealtypische Analysen. Doch der Idealtypus zur 
dateninterpretation ist eher ein Außenseiter im Methodenwettbewerb empirischer 
Gesellschaftsanalysen.” Uta Gerhardt (2001) Idealtypus: Zur methodischen 
Begründung der modernen Soziologie, p.11. It may well be the case that modern 
sociologists are guilty of clumsy and erroneous interpretations of Weber’s concept. 
Yet in purely empirical terms, the concept does enjoy a fair and stable popularity in 
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